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Abstract
Purpose
Facing the dilemma between collaboration and privacy is a continual
challenge for users. In this setting, this paper discusses issues of a highly
flexible role management integrated in a privacy-enhanced collaborative
environment.
Design/methodology/approach
The general framework was provided by former findings of several rese-
arch projects, i.e., collaborative platform BluES and projects of privacy
and identity management PRIME and PrimeLife. The role management
concept bases on a literature survey and has been proofed by integration
into the privacy-enhanced environment BluES’n.
Findings
A three-dimensional role management concept was developed describing
users’ rights, tasks, and positions. A discussion on how to fulfill privacy
requirements yielded that a semi-automated decision making regarding
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the use of roles with different identities is reasonable to support users’
control of their privacy when interacting with others.
Research limitations/implications
The concept of flexible role management complies with the requirements
of privacy-enhanced collaborative environments. However, a fully auto-
mated approach of rule-based information disclosure is not possible as
such decisions depend on personal and situational aspects.
Practical implications
Using the example of a flexible role management concept, research des-
cribed in this paper demonstrates that privacy and interaction concerns
can be balanced and should be considered in application design proces-
ses.
Social implications
Concepts of privacy-enhanced collaborative environments allow respec-
ting privacy-related attitudes and could improve the quality of service
consumption.
Originality/value
The paper demonstrates contrasts between collaboration and privacy at-
titudes and presents solutions for the integration of role management to
overcome this initially supposed contradiction.
Keywords
Role management, privacy, collaborative environments, social software,
BluES’n
1 Introduction
Collaborative applications are nowadays an integral part of many working groups.
These tools deliver their users comprehensive support for communication, collabo-
ration and coordination of the tasks within a working group. This way, co-workers
are enabled to easily create and assess ideas as well as to collaboratively produce
new content, which can be shared among group members. Forums, wikis, or we-
blogs (also known as blogs) are well-established instances of collaborative applicati-
ons. More special software such as groupware or collaborative eLearning platforms
features very similar characteristics.
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However, these possibilities, which are naturally very useful in the indicated app-
lication areas, encompass privacy threats, as well.1 Obviously, collaborative applica-
tions tempt the users not only to indicate factual statements but also to disclose per-
sonal opinions and attitudes as described in Pötzsch and Borcea-Pfitzmann [PBP10].
Technical means (such as anonymization of communication channels, encryption of
communication contents, or using pseudonyms instead of real names) are first-step
approaches to cope with privacy problems caused by the use of provided functiona-
lity of the applications.
Nevertheless, those instruments imply two issues, which are not to be undere-
stimated: First, privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) are typically not provided
together with the actual application. Instead, they are independent tools, the use of
which makes only sense if the user or the application, respectively, does not invade
the user’s privacy, e.g., by sending a unique identifier with each message. Second,
the focus of the privacy-enhancing tools is rather on the traditional perception of
interactions: sender-recipient relationships, i.e., transaction-oriented scenarios bet-
ween a service provider (e.g., an e-shop) and a user (customer).
When turning to collaborative applications (which are to be understood as a par-
ticular type of social software), more demanding requirements need to be conside-
red. Social interactions between several users typically do not follow pre-defined
protocols, but are rather the result of ad-hoc decisions and according activities.
Traditional models of computer communication refer to a clear separation of human
beings and the computers they use In the course of Web 2.0 developments, this
assumption has to be revised in such a way that human beings not only use com-
puters but they also become parts of the digital world. Further, the development
of privacy-enhancing technologies is still triggered by the narrowed assumption
that the surrounding of each person is uniformly untrusted [Cha85]. This, howe-
ver, cannot be applied to social software platforms where interaction is a strongly
wanted feature that would not work in a fully untrusted environment. Consequently,
privacy-respecting applications need to be designed in such a way that the privacy-
enhancing technologies have to be integrated within the applications and they have
to regard the specifics of the applications functionality.
In this context, this paper discusses particular issues and solutions related to the
specific topic of roles and their management, which are important building blocks of
collaborative applications, in a privacy-enhanced collaborative environment (PECE)
supplemented by privacy-enhancing identity management. Accordingly, the paper
is structured as follows: After a description of the particular characteristics of PE-
CEs, an overview of the objectives of roles in collaborative settings will be given
whereby we argue the specific „role“ of roles within PECEs. After this, we describe
1Thereby, the concept of privacy is defined as „the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated
to others.“ [Wes70]
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our integrative approach of an efficient role management within PECEs by splitting
them into three dimensions. Issues related to the interplay of role management and
particular privacy-enhancing mechanisms are pointed out. The paper concludes by
discussing the solution and presents an outlook on further work.
2 Privacy-Enhanced Collaborative Environments
Even if the scientific community is still hesitating in developing adjusted means
to overcome the problems connected to privacy in high-interactional application
environments, several mechanisms already exist that can be used.
One of the most promising approaches is privacy-enhancing identity management,
which, in comparison to traditional ways of identity management (primarily followi-
ng the single-sign-on concept, e.g., Microsoft CardSpace, Liberty Alliance), puts the
user into control of his/her personal data. This means, that the primary identity-
related management functions reside on the users. trusted environments, e.g., at
their computers. Systems realizing privacy-enhancing identity management focus
on the management of different partial identities a user creates and possesses (the
concept of partial identities had been introduced in [PH08]). User control, in this
relation, refers to the possibility of users self-determining which personal data is
disclosed to whom in which application context and to what extent.
Research in the field of privacy-enhancing identity management and the develop-
ment of according prototypes had been in the focus of several projects, e.g., PRIME
(https://www.prime-project.eu/) and PrimeLife (http://www.primelife.eu/),
both of them funded by the EU. In the frame of these projects, several related ar-
ticles were published coping with privacy in community-based environments. Whi-
le Borcea-Pfitzmann et al. [BPHL+06] discusses the specifics of privacy manage-
ment in communities, in general, Borcea-Pfitzmann and Liesebach [BPLP05] as well
as Borcea et al. [FLBP06] describe the approach of integrating privacy-enhancing
identity management into a particular collaborative e-Learning environment, name-
ly BluES’n, which serves as framework for the discussion of this paper.
2.1 BluES’n: A PECE for Learning
BluES’n (to pronounce: BluES enhanced) represents the privacy-enhanced adaptati-
on of the collaborative eLearning platform BluES (which is an abbreviation of BluES
like universal eEducation System). The initial system BluES has been developed in
accordance of the prime paradigm „Each user is allowed to do anything – within the
frame of generally agreed rules and directives“. This particularly means that users
are enabled
• to interact with the system in a self-determined way as well as
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• to interact with other users in a democratic manner.
Learning and working in BluES is not restricted by strong hierarchical structures,
but the system itself fosters vital communication and collaboration among the users
of the eLearning environment. Accordingly, the architecture of the system follows
the paradigm of flexible modularization whereby a small core application integrates
all functionality of the system by plugging in individual modules. That way, the BluES
system allows for a very generic system design that can easily be adapted to the
users’ needs. Specified building blocks reflect that system philosophy and provide
a conceptual structure of the overall system to its users. In the following, the core
building blocks having effect on the role management described in this paper are
presented.
The central building block supporting the work of the users is the workspace.
It is used to separate context-dependent, objective-, and task-oriented processes.
Workspaces are represented not only by the content, which is elaborated on wi-
thin the workspaces’ frames, and the utilities used to manipulate the content, but
workspaces are also characterized by particular properties. These are, e.g., ma-
ximum of participants in the workspace, duration of the workspace being active,
permissions and available roles.
Another important building block comprises the concept of functional modules.
These are software components, which encapsulate task-related functionalities; they
are reusable and configurable according to the corresponding requirements. Func-
tional modules represent the central items of the workspaces. Examples for functio-
nal modules are tools for communication (chat), coordination (calendar), collabora-
tion (wiki or creativity techniques), or for content creation and presentation.
For the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that the core BluES platform
comprises also building blocks related to data management and further information
on this issue can be found in [BP08].
2.2 Privacy and Security Mechanisms in BluES’n
As indicated, the core system BluES has been enhanced with specific modules allo-
wing to preserve the users’ privacy when working with the collaborative application.
Thus with respect to privacy and security, we distinguish between building blocks
for identity management and for access control. Thereby, pseudonyms and partial
identities (pIDs) are concepts of the former building block. Pseudonyms are used to
realize addressability of the users in the collaborative environment. They prevent
linkability to the real identity of a user by substituting account names and are gene-
rated by cryptographic means. Moreover, pseudonyms serve as identifiers of pIDs,
which in turn are used to represent the user in certain contexts. A pID is a subset
of attributes, whereby the union of all pIDs of an individual is her complete identity
[PH08]. In a privacy-enhanced environment, users are enabled to present themsel-
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ves using several pseudonyms towards other users as well as towards the system.
This allows a user to actively control the degree of his/her privacy depending on
how frequently the user selects one and the same pID and on how fine-grained the
pIDs are defined.
An exceptional characteristic of BluES’n consists in a twofold approach of pro-
viding authentication and authorization (i.e., access control): Parallel to the well-
known ACL-based approach implying that each user registers with the system,
BluES’n allows also for an account-less access control approach. This is based on
certified properties – so called anonymous credentials [Cha85] – that are issued to
the users. The credential attests the users their rights to access resources in an in-
dicated way. Beforehand, so called access control policies are being attached to the
resources. The policy indicates which credential(s) a user has to show to get access
to the corresponding resource.
To conclude, users do not need to sign in and to maintain a profile in the system.
Instead, they authenticate only on the layer of interaction between the users (reco-
gnition of pseudonyms) without involving system protocols. Such kind of authenti-
cation is required not for the reason of authorizations, but to give others an idea
with whom they are interacting. The main advantage of this approach is that users
can self-specify particular context boundaries, within which they act presenting one
specific pID of themselves.
The eLearning platform BluES’n comprises further approaches, all of which are
used to cope with the dilemma related to the wish of social interaction and the
privacy attitudes of the users. To indicate but a selection: controlled transmitting
and using according awareness information, cf. e.g. [FLBP06], privacy-respecting
reputation [Ste06], and intra-application partitioning [BDF+05].
3 Overview of Roles in Collaborative Settings
The motivation of integrating roles into a collaborative environment is quite simple:
they do already exist there anyway – at least in an implied way. When users work
together, each of them will take over a certain position within the group to set up
the working scenario. Zhu [Zhu03] states that „without roles, there would be no
collaboration“. A survey of related scientific literature revealed different interpreta-
tions of the concept of roles. According to this, roles can be classified in four main
categories:
1. Positions. Also referred to as status or function, roles can be used to describe
a collection of rights, duties [Lin36], and expectations [Luh84].
2. Groups. Roles are also used to categorize users by similarity. In this way a
role shows the kind of user [Zna65].
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3. Behavior. Roles can be used to assign activities to users [Ger71], e.g., reader
or reviewer.
4. Relations. Finally, roles can describe different kinds of relationship [Mea67]
[Gof74][CJR02]. In that case, the role of a user can differ depending on the
individual interaction partners, e.g., a secretary is a workmate towards other
secretaries, but an employee towards the director.
Based on this variety of understandings, there are different approaches of inte-
grating roles into collaborative learning environments: from simple role manage-
ment systems that distinguish between owner and participant roles, e.g. CommSy
(http://www.commsy.net) via systems to realize role-based access control on mate-
rials or functionalities [Edw96] up to environments providing a universal role mana-
gement system for complex scenarios [KR04]. The prime aim, which all the approa-
ches strive for, consists in gaining particular benefit for users of the applications by
reducing management complexity, i.e., similar actions can be applied to a group of
users at once instead of to each user individually (whereby the group is determined
by the according role uniting the persons). With help of roles, it is possible to gene-
rate a certain work setting [Dil99], to ease access control [NO94], and to assign a
set of duties and expectations to a user group [KR04]. By showing the role of a user
to another, they can get a better understanding of their relation in the current work
setting [Bel04].
In addition to the benefits for access management, integrating roles in PECEs
helps to maintain the focus of the users’ tasks. In particular, with regard to users
heavily using different pIDs, role profiles and descriptions can remind of their aims,
duties, or relationships.
4 Concept of Role Management in PECEs
This section describes the approach of role management developed for integration
in a PECE. It had to face up a proof-of-concept validation by applying it in BluES’n
(cf. section 2). Accordingly, it had to meet the specifics of the e-Learning platform
BluES. This particularly means that 1) the traditional approach of pre-determined
role assignment to user accounts cannot be followed; 2) the users perform all ac-
tivities within workspaces; 3) all users have the same options of participation and
initiation of learning scenarios.
In fact, roles are not needed outside of workspaces except for the role denoted to
users administrating the platform. Within workspaces, a flexible role management is
required that can be adapted to the learning scenarios, e.g., addressing autocratic,
democratic and autonomic settings. Since tasks, authorizations, and team constella-
tions may instantly change during collaborative work, the roles in a workspace have
to be adjustable to such conditions.
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4.1 A Role Concept for a Democratic Collaborative Environment
By integrating roles into a PECE, the facilitation of as many tasks related to user
management as possible is intended. In this context, the following understanding of
roles evolved: Roles describe stereotypes of users, which abstract a group of actors
with equal rights and duties. Certain expectations are placed in users of a specific
stereotype addressing the way the users should act like. Further, assignments of
roles shall also help the interaction partner to range in a user’s position within the
collaborative work.
To develop a highly flexible system that meets the requirements of privacy-pre-
servation, we distinguish the following three dimensions of roles that comply with
their management tasks:
1. Administrative roles are used to manage users. rights and to realize role-
based access control in workspaces, e.g., owner or participant ;
2. Functional roles are used to manage users. tasks by defining particular pri-
vileges, duties, and expectations, e.g., teacher or author;
3. Group-dynamic roles are used to identify a user.s abilities within a group,
e.g., expert or problem solver.
To simplify the general access, every user holds only one administrative role per
workspace. Either, he is the owner possessing all administrative responsibilities
concerning the respective workspace, or he is a participant who is actively involved
in given tasks. Finally, the user may passively attend the work in a workspace as
guest.
With respect to the variety of possible working scenarios and flexible adjustments,
functional roles and their according role attributes, like role title, duties, permissi-
ons, maximum number of role holders etc., may be defined by the (workspace) owner
without restrictions by a set of predefined role definitions. Unlike the administrative
roles, a user may hold more than one functional role. This approach corresponds to
situations of the physical world where people also have to manage more than just
one position within a particular context. Thus, the set of tasks, duties, or respon-
sibilities of a user is formed by his/her individual combination of roles, which are
much easier to manage than a wide division of highly sophisticated role definitions,
like, e.g., an author with reviewing tasks in contrast to an author with reviewing
and teaching tasks.
Group-dynamic roles are used within a particular group and base on calculations
of contextual reputations. This implies that the users’ performances are assessed
regarding certain abilities and corresponding contextual reputation values are cal-
culated. With respect to the determination of group-dynamic roles of users, the re-
putation values of all group members are compared whereby the results define the
assignments of the particular group-dynamic role to the according users.
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For more information about the concept of flexible roles in BluES, see [Lor09] and
[BP08]. By realizing a combination of these three role dimensions, we developed a
role management that is not only able to be adjusted by several role attributes, like
duties, access rights, or expectations, but also by the specific combinations of roles
for users, that makes it usable for a wide range of working scenarios.
4.2 Benefits Regarding Privacy Issues
The described approach of role management in PECEs does not only benefit from
the possibility of flexible role definitions. Integrating roles also opens the possibility
to shift the conditions for provided rights and functionalities from users to roles.
That means that the access control policies of resources as well as of functional mo-
dules indicate roles instead of users denoting them as entities authorized to access
the resource or functional module, respectively. For example, writing access to a
document is allowed for all users possessing the role author. So, it is no longer ne-
cessary to know the particular users having writing access, but they have to prove
the possession of the author credential. In comparison to the well-known role-based
access control mechanism (RBAC), our approach does not require a list of users
assigned to a role, centrally managed by the application server. Instead, that list is
being de-centralized by issuance of credentials indicating the according role to the
respective users. This way, the users maintain control over displaying the role to
others, which again contributes to the ambition of preserving the users’ privacy.
Additionally, users can distribute their roles to different pIDs. Thereby, interaction
partners do not get to know that the roles and the pIDs belong to one particular
person. For instance, a user may act as an author using a pID with the pseudonym
„Joana“. When switching to the functional role reviewer, one and the same user
presents herself as „Hanna“. Since users have the possibility to appear in different
contexts using different pIDs towards their interaction partners, the roles-related
risk of linkability of pIDs decreases to a minimum.
A further advantage addresses the independent evaluation of the reputation of a
user in different contexts (contextual reputation). With the aid of roles, the quality of
a user’s work can independently be evaluated. This way, e.g., a poor reputation value
of an author’s work would not influence his/her standing as reviewer. Or even more
specific since contextual reputations are the basis for group-dynamic roles: A person
can gain high reputation as a team leader while not really asserting himself/herself
in conflicting situations as mediator. That way, reputation-related assessments of
the user by others will not bias each other. Obviously, privacy can only be really
preserved if the user applies distinct pseudonyms for the different contexts denoting
her as team leader and mediator.
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5 Discussion of the Concept
With the described concept of role management developed for PECEs, users may
distribute their roles onto several pIDs to minimize linkability between different
activities and linkability to the physical identity of themselves. In result, it redu-
ces the risk of linking disclosed personal data to a complete identity. Although we
provide possibilities to distribute role attributes to several roles according to the
management tasks and to use those roles with different pIDs, users have to be care-
ful concerning the granularity of their data distribution, nevertheless. If they use
only few pIDs, it is relatively easy to create links between them. In such a case,
the attributes of the pIDs would be very similar and parts of the personal data used
within the individual pIDs could overlap. This may lead to situations where other
users could associate those pIDs of the user, based on same identity attributes.
In BluES’n, a decision suggestion module (DSM) has been integrated to support
users with selecting the appropriate pID according to the corresponding context. To
enhance the DSM support for managing roles, we analyzed which context can be
important for using a role and in which situations do the users switch to another
pID, cf. Table 1. For this, we devolve the pseudonym classification of Pfitzmann and
Hansen [PH08].
Changing pseudonym per
Kind of
pseudonym
Role
Interaction
partner
Trans-
action
Example
Person
pseudonym
– – –
Identity card or national
insurance number
Role
pseudonym
• – – Different login names in
online shops and platforms
Relationship
pseudonym
– • –
Different customer IDs for
airline and insurance for
the same flight
Role-
relationship
pseudonym
• • – Contract numbers
Transaction
pseudonym
(•) (•) • TAN numbers for bank
transfers
Tabelle 1: Classification of pseudonyms based on interaction partners, roles and
transactions, cf. [Lor09]
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In accordance to these contexts, we determined possibilities for selection rules of
pIDs that can be performed by the DSM. Afterwards, we evaluated the ability of the
rule to protect the users’ privacy:
• With transaction pseudonyms, the highest degree of privacy can be rea-
ched, because every pID is used only once and will not be reused in future.
In collaborative environments, recognitions of interaction partners and sha-
red experiences are indispensable for reasonable group work. Therefore, an
automatic creation of a new pID each time a transaction is performed is not an
adequate solution.
• Role, relationship and role-relationship pseudonyms solve the problem of
recognizability, but limit the free choice of disclosure of personal data by the
user. To give an example, in case of a pID created towards a particular inter-
action partner, the user has to disclose all those personal data (encapsulated
within this pID) that will be needed in transactions covered by this relation-
ship or role. Thus, an automatic selection of the proper pID based on a certain
role, a certain relationship, or a role-relationship relation is problematic with
respect to privacy, as well.
• The option of creating just one pID (person pseudonym), which would imp-
ly all of a user’s personal data required for any transaction within the collabo-
rative environment, corresponds to the traditional account-based approach. It
would eliminate all privacy-enhancing benefits. This again is not an acceptable
way for role management in PECEs.
As a result, we appoint that there is no default way to realize an automatic selecti-
on of pIDs according to the chosen roles the users act with. The DSM may only give
advices to the user, which corresponds to the user’s preferences, e.g., a user strictly
distinguishes between trusted workspaces in contrast to open ones when selecting
pIDs.
An additional argument needs to be considered referring to roles being informa-
tion about a user. Thus, roles may also imply privacy threats. Especially, if just a
few holders of one and the same role exist within the environment, it could enable
non-authorized persons to link the pIDs indicating that role to each other. In cases
where each user is aware of the existence of only one role holder, e.g., a working
group has exactly one team leader, every pID showing this role can be associated
with the one person known from the physical world.
6 Conclusion and Outlook
In PECEs, technologies of privacy-enhancing identity management are used to pro-
tect the users’ privacy. This way, the user.s personal data are distributed onto several
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pIDs. To prevent unauthorized collections of personal data by service providers as
well as by other users, PECEs provide means for user-controlled disclosure of per-
sonal data, i.e., users may decide by themselves, which information can be accessed
by whom in which application context and to what extent.
Displaying roles to the interaction partners of a user means to reveal a hint, which
could be used to link the user’s pIDs and to create a detailed profile about that user
from the collected data. With the help of a flexible and decoupled role management,
the roles of a user may be distributed onto several pIDs. Thus, every pID of a user
holds a different set of roles. That way, the risk for the users’ privacy can be reduced.
The analysis of options for self-acting selections of pIDs by the DSM of BluES.n has
shown that there is no standard way for selecting the right pID. The DSM only
can make proposals based on the user preferences and on her previous behavior.
Finally, the users have to decide on the appropriate distribution of their personal
data. A privacy-enhancing identity management may help them with this task albeit
a standard solution for choosing the proper granularity of pIDs does not exist.
The work documented in this paper is well elaborated with respect to developing
the concept and discussing privacy issues related to the concept. Its technical reali-
zability has been proved by a first implementation and integration of administrative
and functional roles into BluES’n. Also, a module has been developed specifically ad-
dressing the assessment of the users performance and the calculation of reputation
values. Our future work will take up the integration work, which needs to be fina-
lized, as well as to focus on experimental evaluation, e.g., conducting an according
study with real users.
Acknowledgement
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Com-
munity’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement
no. 216483.
Literaturverzeichnis
[BDF+05] Katrin Borcea, Hilko Donker, Elke Franz, Katja Liesebach, Andreas
Pfitzmann, and Hagen Wahrig. Intra-application partitioning of perso-
nal data. In Alfred Kobsa and Lorrie Cranor, editors, Proceedings of the
Workshop on Privacy-Enhanced Personalization (PEP’05), pages 67–72.
UC Irvine Institute for Software Research (ISR), Edinburgh, UK, June
2005. URL http://www.isr.uci.edu/pep05/papers/borcea-pep.pdf.
12
[Bel04] Raymond Meredith Belbin. Management teams: why they succeed or
fail, volume 2. Oxford, 2004. ISBN 0-7506-5910-6. URL http://books.
google.de/books?id=PYYtYhOeEyMC.
[BP08] Katrin Borcea-Pfitzmann. Framework für die entwicklung einer
universellen kollaborativen elearning-plattform. Phd thesis, Tech-
nische Universität Dresden, Fakultät Informatik, Dresden, Septem-
ber 2008. URL http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:14-ds-
1237287991632-27077.
[BPHL+06] Katrin Borcea-Pfitzmann, Marit Hansen, Katja Liesebach, Andreas Pfitz-
mann, and Sandra Steinbrecher. What user-controlled identity mana-
gement should learn from communities. Information Security Techni-
cal Report, 11(3):119–128, 2006. URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.
com/retrieve/pii/S1363412706000343.
[BPLP05] Katrin Borcea-Pfitzmann, Katja Liesbach, and Andreas Pfitzmann. Esta-
blishing a privacy-aware collaborative elearning environment. In Pro-
ceedings of the EADTU Working Conference 2005, volume 2005, pages
10–11. EADTU, Rome, Italy, November 2005. URL http://www.eadtu.
nl/proceedings/2005/papers/KatrinBorcea-Pfitzmann.pdf.
[Cha85] David Chaum. Security without identification: transaction systems to
make big brother obsolete. Communications of the ACM, 28(10):1030–
1044, 1985. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/4372.4373.
[CJR02] Angela Carell, Isa Jahnke, and Natalja Reiband. Computergestütztes
kollaboratives lernen: Die bedeutung von partizipation, wissensinte-
gration und einfluss von rollen. Journal Hochschuldidaktik, 13(2):26–
35, September 2002. ISSN 0949-2429. URL http://www.sociotech-
lit.de/CaJR02-CkL.pdf.
[Dil99] Pierre Dillenbourg. What do you mean by collaborative learning? In
Pierre Dillenbourg, editor, Collaborative-learning: Cognitive and Com-
putational Approaches, pages 1–19. Elsevier, Oxford, 1999.
[Edw96] W. Keith Edwards. Policies and roles in collaborative applications. In
Proceedings of the 1996 ACM conference on Computer supported co-
operative work - CSCW ’96, pages 11–20. ACM Press, New York, USA,
November 1996. ISBN 0-89791-765-0. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.
1145/240080.240175.
[FLBP06] Elke Franz, Katja Liesbach, and Katrin Borcea-Pfitzmann. Privacy-
aware user interfaces within collaborative environments. In Kristijan
13
Mihalic, editor, Proceedings of the international workshop in conjunci-
ton with AVI 2006 on Context in advanced interfaces – AVI ’06, pages
45–48. ACM Press, New York, USA, 2006. URL http://dx.doi.org/
10.1145/1145706.1145715.
[Ger71] Uta Gerhardt. Rollenanalyse als kritische Soziologie: Ein konzeptuel-
ler Rahmen zur empirischen und methodologischen Begründung einer
Theorie der Vergesellschaftung. Number 72 in Soziologische Texte.
Luchterhand, Neuwied, Berlin, 1971.
[Gof74] E. Goffman. Rollenkonzepte und Rollendistanz. Hoffmann und Campe
Verlag, Hamburg, 1974. ISBN 978-3455091182.
[KR04] Andrea Kienle and Carsten Ritterskamp. Rollenbasierte kooperations-
unterstützung in cscl-umgebungen. In Gregor Engels and Silke Seehu-
sen, editors, Proceedings of DeLFI 2004, Die 2.e-Learning Fachtagung
Informatik, Lecture Notes in Informatics, pages 223–224. Springer,
Bonn, 2004. URL http://www.sociotech-lit.de/KiRi04-RKi.pdf.
[Lin36] Ralph Linton. The study of man: an introduction. Appleton Century
Crofts, Inc., New York, USA, 1936. ISBN 978-0138589691.
[Lor09] Anja Lorenz. Rollenmanagement trifft Privatsphäre: Problempunkte
und Konsequenzen. VDM-Verlag, Saarbrücken, 2009.
[Luh84] Niklas Luhmann. Soziale Systeme. Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie.
Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt, 1984. ISBN 351857700X.
[Mea67] George Herbert Mead. Mind, Self and Society. University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 3 edition, 1967.
[NO94] Matunda Nyanchama and Sylvia L. Osborn. Access rights administrati-
on in role-based security systems. In Proceedings of the IFIP WG11.3
Working Conference on Database Security VII, pages 37–56. North-
Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, The Netherlands, The Nether-
lands, 1994. ISBN 0-444-81976-2. URL http://dl.acm.org/citation.
cfm?id=679923.
[PBP10] Stefanie Pötzsch and Katrin Borcea-Pfitzmann. Privacy-respecting ac-
cess control in collaborative workspaces. In Michele Bezzi, Penny Du-
quenoy, Simone Fischer-Hübner, Marit Hansen, and Ge Zhang, edi-
tors, Privacy and Identity, IFIP AICT 320, volume 320/2010 of IFIP
Advances in Information and Communication Technology, pages 102–
111. Springer, Boston, 2010. ISBN 978-3-642-14281-9. URL http:
//dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14282-6_8.
14
[PH08] Andreas Pfitzmann and Marit Hansen. Anonymity, unlinkability, unde-
tectability, unobservability, pseudonomity and identity management –
a consolidated proposal for terminology. Draft, Version 0.31, Febru-
ar 2008. URL http://dud.inf.tu-dresden.de/Anon_Terminology.
shtml.
[Ste06] Sandra Steinbrecher. Design options for privacy-respecting reputation
systems within centralised internet communities. In Simone Fischer-
Hübner, Kai Rannenberg, Louise Yngström, and Stefan Lindskog, edi-
tors, Security and Privacy in Dynamic Environments: Proceedings of
the IFIP TC-1 1 2 1st International Information Security Conference
(SEC 2006), volume 201 of IFIP, pages 123–134. Springer, Boston,
2006. ISBN 0-387-33405-X. ISSN 1861-2288. URL http://www.
springerlink.com/content/9423773p13q287k6/.
[Wes70] Alan Westin. Privacy and Freedom. Atheneum, New York, 1970.
[Zhu03] Haibin Zhu. Some issues of role-based collaboration. In Guy Oliver,
Samuel Pierre, and Vijay KEditors Sood, editors, Proceedings of Cana-
dian Conference on Electrical and Computer Engineering 2003 (IEEE
CCECE 2003), volume 2, pages 687–690. IEEE Computer Society, Mon-
treal, Canada, 2003. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CCECE.2003.
1225988.
[Zna65] Florian Znaniecki. Social relations and social roles: the unfinished sy-
stematic sociology. Chandler publications in anthropology and sociolo-
gy. Chandler Pub. Co., San Francisco, CA, 1965.
15
